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1. The aim and the context of the research 
The general aim of my dissertation is analyzing the waves of reforms having happened within the 
Hungarian central and territorial government coordination since the transition. In this context, 
the dissertation seeks to examine the emerging patterns and the main structural characteristics of 
government coordination in Hungary with a special focus on the one stop shop coordination 
initiative. My research would contribute to the better understanding of the motives of Hungarian 
public administration reforms. 
The dissertation has three main special ambitions. These are the followings: 
1. First of all, the dissertation pursues descriptive ambitions. It gives a comprehensive 
overview about the evolution of government coordination in Hungary and the discursive 
environment (for example: reform ideas and actions, academic and practitioner debates) 
surrounding it. 
2. In addition to giving a general description I am particularly interested in one specific 
aspect of governmental coordination. Namely, the coordinating functions – the problems 
targeted and the instruments chosen in order to alleviate them – appearing in the 
consecutive waves of reform. Therefore the second ambition of my research to give an 
empirically based overall analysis of coordination instruments and instrument mixes in 
Hungary. The research investigates the coordination instruments on the central and 
territorial government level with a special focus on the innovative one stop shop 
coordination instrument. 
3. Finally, the third ambition is to contribute to a better understanding of the motives and 
driving forces underlying the governmental coordination reforms in Hungary. Therefore I 
investigate the decision making process and the motives of the Government Windows 
project in particular and possibly the results of the analysis delivers useful information 
and benefits more generally, about the present-time reform initiatives in Hungary too. 
Coordination among different social actors, governmental units and departments is not a recently 
emerging phenomenon. It has always been a problem since the states and governments have 
existed. Nonetheless, the choice of research subject may be justified by two main elements. 
Firstly, the governmental coordination and the problems around that have become more 
prominent concerns in recent years. Secondly, the government coordination has been, with the 
desire to strengthen it, - throughout the Hungary’s post-transition history - a very frequent 
objective of administrative reform intentions and actions. Notwithstanding this frequency, the 
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recurring waves of central government coordination reform has been a relatively neglected area 
of systematic longitudinal research. These arguments are described in more detail below. 
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1.1. Coordination as a frequent element of administrative reforms 
The introduction of coordination initiatives in public administration is a frequent element of 
contemporary administrative development (or reform) activities all over the world. In my 
dissertation I deal with those factors that have eroded the coordination capacities of 
governments. These are only listed below: 
 Globalization 
 ‘wicked’ or transboundary problems, 
 Financial restraints of governments; 
 The achievements and negative results of New Public Management reforms. Such as 
the establishment of single- purpose organizations [Kettl 2000, Hood 1991], and the 
modes of operation of them were ’silo – mentality’ and initiation of quazi – autonomous 
agencies that are out of the strength central control. (agensification).  
These facts have tended to increase the fragmentation of public administration and enhanced the 
need for integration and coordination. The establishment of new coordination arrangements can 
be seen as a reaction to these with the clear intention to decrease the horizontal and vertical 
fragmentation within public administration. It has therefore started to look beyond NPM and to 
develop new approaches - both in the academic and practical environment – to solve these de –
coordination problems. The common feature of these new approaches was the greater reliance 
on coordination mechanisms and integration. Mixtures of old and also innovative coordination 
initiatives and models were emerged to strengthen the governmental coordination. These 
coordination models – frequently called post – NPM reforms - were spread across the world in 
different shapes and with different names. The main idea of post – NPM doctrines is to define 
them in terms of what they oppose. Namely, all of them counter to NPM type initiatives. Their 
common features are the intention to enhance the coordination capacity of government, to 
extent the scale of integration, to spread the 
The new coordination practices come in various shapes and various names, such as whole – of - 
government [Christensen and Laegreid 2007, OECD 2006], joined-up government [ Pollitt 2003], 
holistic governance [Perri 2004, 1997 ]. The common feature of them is the notion that strengthening 
cooperation will enable better problem solving system within the society.  
This trend of strengthening coordination has not avoided Hungary either. From 1990 – when all 
Communist party structures were eliminated – there were recurring intentions and actions acting 
towards strengthening coordination on different levels of government. This effort peaked in 2010 
when the second Orban government introduced its comprehensive government reform program 
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(Magyary Program) [Közigazgatási és Igazságügyi Minisztérium 2011]) that consist of wholesale 
constitutional and legislative changes. These reform waves between 2010-2014 consisted of 
elements that reshuffle and transform the entire system of coordination structures and 
mechanisms within public administration. One remarkable elements of these coordination 
initiatives is the establishment of the Government Window one stop shop.  
1.2. Setting the dissertation in the context of Hungarian literature  
The research ambitions cannot be justified only with the frequency of government coordination 
reforms, but the other reason seems to be relevant that the scarcity of the coordination literature. 
The government coordination has rarely, if ever, been an emphatic analytical subject in 
scholarship dealing with Hungary’s government system. Notwithstanding the government 
coordination has been, with the desire to strengthen it, - throughout the Hungary’s post-
transition history - a very frequent objective of administrative reform intentions and actions, the 
recurring waves of government coordination reform has been a relatively neglected area of 
systematic longitudinal research. However, the topic of government structure and the structural 
characteristics of public administration [Bércesi 2002; Balázs – Bércesi 2006; Bércesi – Ivancsics 
2006; Ivancsics 2006; Barta 2012; Vadál 2012Müller 2011, 2010c, 2010b; Sárközy 2006, 2010, 
2012], the decision making process on central level [Pesti 2000] or the changing role of 
government actors [Gajduschek 2011, Müller 2011, Szente 1999, Szilvássy 1998] were analyzed in 
the Hungarian literature, mainly from legal and political perspective. Additionally to these scarcity 
of Hungarian governmental coordination literature, coordination concepts most of the time were, 
and still are, conceived in a very specific, extremely narrow way. The entire problem perception, 
or approach, in which policy makers, politicians and academics alike conceived the very problem 
of coordination was restricted to this “top-down” style conceptualization - the “(central) control 
versus (regional/sectoral) autonomy” dimension - and disregarding any non-hierarchical – let 
alone market or cultural – mechanisms of coordination. This scarcity of scholarship on 
government coordination is characteristic for the entire post-Hungarian area. Hence, it seems to 
be a beneficial contribution to adopt and outlines a broader perceptions and conceptual 
framework of coordination and coordination instruments in my dissertation. 
1.3. Circumstances leading to the research 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s 
Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project COCOPS ; 
www.cocops.eu), Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities. The COCOPS project (Coordinating 
for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future) seek to comparatively and quantitatively assess 
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the impact of New Public Management-style reforms in European countries, drawing on a team 
of European public administration scholars from 11 universities in 10 countries. It analysed the 
impact of reforms in public management and public services that address citizens’ service needs 
and social cohesion in Europe. [General information of the project; http://www.cocops.eu/] My 
research directly links to the Working Packages 5 (WP5) of this project. The WP5 aimed to 
search and identify innovative coordination practices and related steering instruments in public 
management in European public sectors and to compile a good practice database and case study 
catalogue of such coordination practices with direct utility to public managers and the research 
community. One of the innovative coordination measures from the Hungarian government 
practice was the Government Window reform case. This case study was described and analysed 
by me and my supervisor in the project. [Kovács – Hajnal 2014] The case selection can be 
justified by the reason that the purpose was to identify such new type coordination initiatives that 
enable to compare it with other countries’ similar practices. (The organizational integration e.g. 
the establishment of county government offices or restructuring ministerial system - those might 
have greater importance – cannot really fit with this ‘innovative’ criterion.) 
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2. The research questions and the methods 
To give an overview on the formulated research questioned and pre-defined hypothesis I 
summarized them in the table below: 
Table 1: The research questions and the hypothesis 
Research questions The (rival)hypothesis of the research  
RQ (1): What were 
the main 
characterisctics of the 
Hungarian 
government 
coordination and the 
effort to improving it 
during the post –
transition period? 
RQ (1/a): What were 
the main debates or 
discussion points 
around the 
government 
coordination? What 
characterized the post 
–transition Hungary’s 
academic and 
practitioner discourse 
on the 
conceptualization of 
coordination 
problems and 
coordination 
instruments?  
Hyp(1/a): The academic and practitioner discourse in 
post-transition Hungary is characterized by a 
predominance of conceptualizing the lack of coordination 
as the lack of clear lines of authority, and instruments of 
coordination as a hierarchical, command-and-control type 
relationships. 
 
RQ (1/b) What types 
of coordination 
instruments 
(instrument mixes) – 
hierarchical vs. non – 
hierarchical - were 
adopted in the 
different reforms? 
What are the main 
structural features of 
them? 
Hyp(1/b)1: Hierarchical coordination 
instruments are likely to be introduced if, and 
only if, a given actor’s –central government 
actors– political and power base significantly 
strengthens. In the absence of such a clear shift in 
power relations, however, hierarchical instruments 
are unlikely to be introduced. 
Hyp(1/b)2: If such a clear shift in power relations 
does occur then non-hierarchical instruments are, 
in contrast, unlikely to be adopted. This type of 
instruments is mostly relied upon only if balanced 
power relations are sustained. 
RQ (1/c) What are 
the main features of 
the Hungarian one 
stop shop – the 
Government 
Windows -, and how 
do these features 
relate to other 
countries’ similar 
experience? 
- 
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RQ (2) What are the main motives underlying 
the initiation of different coordination 
instruments/instruments mixes? In particular, 
which explanatory model seems to have larger 
explanatory power in the context of 
Hungary’s recent one-stop-government 
reforms? 
 
Hyp (2/Null):  
Coordination reforms and 
measures are not 
necessarily made because 
there are well-defined 
demands, real needs and 
facts which require 
governmental action. 
Rather, coordination 
measures are guided by the 
norms and rules that are 
commonly shared among 
actors, governments actions 
are driven by the standards 
of appropriateness. 
Hyp (2/Alt.): According 
to the instrumental 
rationality governmental 
coordination measures are 
seen as decision makers’ 
purposeful, rational actions 
addressing specific, well-
defined conditions, 
constraints, needs and/or 
problems. 
RQ(3): To what extent did the different 
instrument mixes work as intended? In 
particular: is there a significant difference in 
this regard between hierarchical and non-
hierarchical instruments?  
 
Hyp.(3/Null): 
Coordination patterns 
change – in the sense of 
real immediate effects 
occurring in the field – only 
as a consequence of 
applying hierarchical 
coordination instruments. 
In the absence of them no 
actual change is likely to 
occur. 
 
Hyp.(3/Alt.): Different – 
in particular: hierarchical 
versus non-hierarchical 
instruments - do not 
systematically differ in 
terms of their ability to 
trigger actual change in 
coordination patterns. 
Source: own compilation 
The data and the method by which the above research questions are answered are outlined 
below. In order to answer the research questions three sources of data are used.  
- Legal measures (laws and other regulations) and official documents are predominantly 
used to describe the changes of governmental structures; 
- The coordination landscape of post-transition Hungary is examined on the basis of a 
review, and secondary analysis of available (mostly Hungarian language) literature. A 
review of (quasi-)academic literature on the topic in Hungarian language – including 
academic discussion on the issue, official government communication materials, personal 
interview materials with practitioners that summarize practitioners’ personal views and 
experiences regarding a given issue. 
- In addition, primary empirical sources are utilized. In-depth interviews with present and 
former senior officials and experts particularly knowledgeable about the field were 
conducted. So far 15 interviews have been performed with such governmental key figures 
and/or experts. The interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2014. Two of the 
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interviewees have been serving for six or more years in the Hungarian central government 
as civil servants and during the recent election cycle – between 2010 -2014 - both of them 
were in charge of coordination issues. Both of them owned a key position in the central 
ministries of governmental coordination - in the Ministry of Public Administration and 
Justice - as a permanent state secretary or a deputy state secretary. Another range of 
interviews were conducted with experts of the field. One of them served from 1990 to 
2006 continuously in the Prime Minister’s Office in the same position, as the highest 
ranking civil servant in charge of central government coordination. The fifth key 
informant owned a strong and continues political position in the Hungarian parliament 
and within different governments during the post – transition period since 2014. She was 
in ministerial position between 2002 – 2007. Another interviewees were (or still are) the 
heads of one of the agencies affected by the public administration territorial reforms.  
The emerging empirical material was analyzed using a document analysis worksheet. 
2.1. The method of the analyses of central and territorial governmental coordination  
The dissertation gives an overview and analyses on three main areas of government coordination. 
I examined the coordination mechanisms on (1) central level, (2) territorial level of government 
and I particularly focused on the newly initiated one stop shop coordination initiatives, the 
‘Government Windows’. 
My core research subject – the central level and territorial level of coordination and its reforms – 
can be best described and analyzed as four – both at central and territorial level - , clearly 
separable, waves of reform, each characterized by a particular context and content clearly 
differentiating it from the others. Therefore in presenting and analyzing evidence and arguments 
my primary unit of analysis is the ‘reform cases’. Four to four such cases are described and 
analyzed in my dissertation both on central and territorial level, utilizing the same analytical 
framework and structure. 
When choosing such a framework one should keep in mind that the research of administrative 
reforms is “often complicated by discrepancies between the world of ideas and the world of 
practices”. [Brunsson 1989 cited by Christensen and Laegreid 2002: 577.] In order to avoid the 
pitfalls of incomplete documentation of the public administration reform stories, my 
investigation of the reforms applies three analytical points: context, content and process. (This 
analytical framework is applied with a special emphasis in the examination of territorial reforms 
where each analytical point is presented separately.) I use the ‘content’ in terms of normative/de 
jure components of the reform and particularly to the extent/form to which the coordination 
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instruments are taken into account by the legislator. The content of administrative reform is 
strongly determined by nature and location of functional challenges [Toonen 2002:568.] that I call 
‘context’. Under the label of context the functional and operational challenges in the given system 
are studied and analyzed in my dissertation. The external (e.g. Europeanization) and internal 
(historical and political background and traditions, financial resources, number/strength/interest 
of stakeholders) conditions often determine the direction of the reforms and constrain the room 
for manoeuvre of the government. The third analytical angle is the ‘outcomes’ refers to the 
degree to which the government ambitions composed by the reform ‘content’ become reality or 
de facto being pursued in practice at all. Under the label of ‘outcome’ I emphasize the distinction 
between the planned versus emerging change; that is, I am primarily interested in the extent, to 
which different (mixes of) coordination instruments introduced by the different reforms work in 
reality as expected or, rather, deviate from the ‘blueprint’. 
For a better overview and understanding of the finding and results of my research, the different 
coordination initiatives are presented and classified in tables. 
2.2. The method of the structural analyses of ‘Government Window’ one stop shop 
The empirical basis of analyzing the Government Windows initiative is a qualitative case study 
conducted in the course of summer 2012 (with continuous follow-up field research). The 1/c 
research question – which has predominantly a descriptive ambition – seeks to identify the 
structural features of Hungarian one stop shop and intends to link the study to existing, more 
ambitious studies on one-stop government. Askim et al. (2011) examine and compare three 
countries’ one-stop government experience in the field of labor and welfare administration. The 
comparative analytical structure they propose consists of the following dimensions: 
- Task portfolio (narrow vs. broad and shallow vs. deep); 
- Participant structure (simple vs. complex); 
- Level of participants’ autonomy (low vs. high); 
- Proximity to citizens (distant vs. close); 
- Instruments used (low vs. high degree of integration). 
These have proven to be useful analytical concepts for describing one-stop government 
experience; therefore I utilized them, and – by doing so – it is possible to compare the Hungarian 
one-stop government experience with that of some other countries. 
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2.3. In search of explanations: The framework for analysis the motives underlying the 
’Government Window’ reform  
According to the second research question, my dissertation seeks to contribute to a better 
understanding of the motives and driving forces underlying the Government The neo-
institutional theory appears well-suited to examining the problem of machinery-of-government 
reforms such as the creations of Government Windows. According to Peters ([1988:21.) “such an 
institutional theory would be crucial for understanding how the machinery of government 
influences the development of public policy”. This theory has been grappling with one major 
problem: emphasizes the role of institutions and explaining of human actions within an 
organization, social order, or society [March and Olsen 1998]. New institutionalism suggests two 
competing explanatory factor – alternative “institutional logics”- regarding the basic logic of 
action by which human behaviour is interpreted. Within the tradition of the first type of logic, the 
logic of appropriateness, “actions are seen as rule-based” [March and Olsen 1998], where human 
actors evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a 
specific situation for solving problem. According the second logic, the logic of consequences sees 
action as driven by expectations of consequences where conscious human actors choose among 
alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives [March 
and Olsen 1998]. Three out of the four competing explanations of the Government Windows 
reform can be classified as marked by the logic of consequentiality: (1) the rational problem 
solving model; (2) the power model and (3) the Europeanization model. The fourth explanation: 
(4) the Myth of Central Control, however, belongs to the realm of the logic of appropriateness. 
To answer the second research question and to gain insight and understanding about qualitative 
case data I use the method of “pattern-matching” between competing, rival theoretical 
propositions (mentioned above) and observations in a set of data. This approach is one way of 
achieving a critical test, which is, testing the relative empirical strengths of competing theories. 
Testing consists of matching an “observed pattern” (a pattern of measured values) with an 
“expected pattern” (a hypothesis), and deciding whether these patterns match (resulting in a 
confirmation of the hypothesis) or do not match. The main idea of the pattern matching is to 
explore whether or not the pattern of a case matches the pattern predicted by a theory [Lange 
2013:53]. I use this method in the dissertation as a hypothesis testing procedure to examine 
theoretical propositions in my case study research. 
The core phase of the analysis is the development and testing of a ‘prediction matrix’. “The 
prediction matrix sets up the ‘pattern’, based on theory, to be either confirmed or disconfirmed 
by the case data.” [Wilson and Woodside 1999:217] One dimension of this matrix is stretched 
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along the different explanations / models to be tested and thereby confirmed or disconfirmed. 
These hypothetical explanations will be enumerated and described in the next subsection.  
The other dimension of the prediction matrix involves different elements, or features, of the 
decision making and feedback process. Having regard to the fact that the Government Window 
project is an ongoing reform with open ended leaving all sorts of problems the scope of our 
analysis is limited to the decision making and follow-up /feedback activities, and excludes 
elements of actual implementation. 
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3. The main findings and results of the dissertation  
3.1.  The main characteristics of the conceptualization of coordination in Hungary 
Earlier research conducted by us on system (national) level government coordination [Hajnal and 
Kovács 2013] suggested that ‘the core problem of coordination’ as well as the tools and 
instruments applicable to alleviate it are, throughout Hungary’s post-transition history, 
understood and treated in a way that is peculiarly different from the conceptualizations and 
practices usually characterizing the international practice and academic literature.  
Namely, there seems to be an unquestioned consensus that the ‘lack / insufficiency of 
coordination’ is more or less the same as ‘the lack of command-and-control’ over those to be 
coordinated; and, consequently, that the dominant instrument of coordination is hierarchy. 
Accordingly, except for some minor exceptions, there is a general disregard and unawareness of 
other conceptualizations of what the problem of coordination entails, as well as of the 
instruments available to alleviate them. 
Table 2: Comparing the main characteristics of the conceptualization of coordination in 
the Hungarian and the mainstream international literature  
Perceptions of  
coordination  
International literature Hungarian literature 
Problem 
perception  
Overlaps/ parallelism/redundancy 
between organizations and programs; 
‘wicked problems’, fragmentation 
“top-down” style conceptualization - 
the “(central) control versus 
(regional/sectoral) autonomy” 
dimension 
The reason of  
coordination 
problems  
The elements of  initiated NMP 
reforms (fragmentation/siloisation); 
globalizations  
Lack or insufficient hierarchical/ 
bureaucratic command and control  
Alternative 
solutions 
Hierarchical – Network – Market 
type mechanisms  
Bureaucratic type mechanism: 
strengthening central command and 
control over subordinated bodies. 
Type of  
coordination 
instruments  
Mixes of  Horizontal and vertical/ 
Compulsory and voluntary co - 
operations 
‘ Hard instruments’: compulsory 
organizational integration, central 
command and control vs. ‘soft 
instruments’: horizontal (ineffective) 
cooperation 
Source: own compilation and analyses based on the mainstream international and Hungarian literature 
 
According to the findings presented above, the formulated hypotheses can be confirmed, namely: 
Hyp(1/a): The academic and practitioner discourse in post-transition Hungary is characterized by a predominance 
of conceptualizing the lack of coordination as the lack of clear lines of authority, and instruments of coordination as 
a hierarchical, command-and-control type relationships. 
 
17 
 
3.2. The main characteristics of government coordination reforms in Hungary 
With the detailed description of the consecutive waves of structural reform in the dissertation I 
gave responded to the (1/b) research question posed in earlier, namely: 
RQ (1/b) What types of coordination instruments (instrument mixes) – hierarchical vs. non – 
hierarchical - were adopted in the different reforms? What are the main structural features of them? 
Focusing on (the changes in) the coordinative functions appearing on the central and territorial 
tier of state coordination machinery I showed how the governmental reformers perceived the 
problem of insufficient coordination and how they tried to solve them.  
The former issue shows a rather stable pattern: coordination efforts targeted a few areas 
throughout the post-1990 era. On the central level of government the recurring coordination 
issue was whether the ministers represent their own sectoral interests within the central 
government, or the ministers rather act for the will of the whole of government within sectoral 
ministries. On the territorial level of public administration a (smaller) part of the problem was the 
lack or insufficiency on inter-agency collaboration in the field of policy implementation, while 
most of the efforts attempted to “roll back” the (allegedly) chaotic / overlapping / contradictory 
mushrooming of agencies and functions on the territorial level. Of particular importance in this 
latter aspect were some sort of standardization and unification in such vital support functions as 
HRM, ICT, financial management, and facilities management. 
It is important to note that the analysed reforms differ in that sense of what measures and what 
type of instruments were initiated to enhance coordination. Below these instruments are listed 
and classified. 
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Table 3. : Coordination instruments changes in subsequent structural reforms in central 
government (1990 – 2014) 
Type of 
the 
instrume
nts 
Changes in central coordination instruments 
1990-1998 1998- 2006 2006-2010 2010-2014 
R
a
th
e
r 
h
ie
ra
rc
h
ic
a
l 
S
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
 
The PMO with 
a narrow scope 
of coordination 
competence  
- A ‘referral’ system 
is in the PMO 
entitled to 
examine/filter/reje
ct initiatives 
coming from the 
ministry before it 
could get the 
Cabinet’s agenda. 
- Four political 
state sectaries 
were appointed to 
supervise the 
operation of 
‘referral’ system. 
- Merging ministries 
and a number of 
agencies. 
- The mirror 
departments were 
merged with the 
legal department of 
the PMO in 2009 
that results a highly 
diminution in 
importance of the 
institution. 
- Eight integrated 
‘super-ministries’ 
emerged by merging 
former ministries. 
- PMO was re-
structured into a 
MPAJ and a Cabinet 
Office. Both 
organizations 
characterized by 
growing staff and units 
and a broadening task 
portfolio. 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
ra
l/
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
 
- PMO supervise 
the ministerial 
submissions 
from legal and 
codificational 
aspects. 
- PMO was entitled 
to prepare 
submission on 
highly important 
and political salient 
issues. These drafts 
represented the 
central 
government’s, or 
rather the PM’s 
interests 
- The formal and 
informal extension 
of PM’ s authority 
(e.g. the strategically 
most salient 
coordinating bodies 
led by the PM by 
himself).  
- The ‘policy 
consultation’ 
required each 
ministry to have its 
proposition 
approved by the 
PMO prior to the 
administrative 
consultation process. 
 
 
- Central control of 
recruitment and 
hiring process of 
central state 
administrative 
apparatus by MPAJ. 
- The PSS of MPAJ 
decides whether policy 
initiations may enter 
to the Cabinet meeting 
(in place of committee 
of state secretaries). 
- The standardisation 
among ministerial 
organizations by the 
central control of 
MPAJ. 
- The ‘policy 
consultation’ was 
renamed as 
‘preliminary 
judgement’ takes 
place within MPAJ.  
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R
a
th
e
r 
n
o
n
 –
 h
ie
ra
rc
h
ic
a
l 
S
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
 
- Council of 
Permanent 
State 
Secretaries 
discussed all 
and any items 
on the agenda 
of the next 
Cabinet 
Meeting. 
- Cabinet 
meetings was 
the highest 
forum of 
political 
consultation. 
None substantial 
changes. 
- Abolishment the 
position and 
councils of 
Permanent State 
Secretaries  
- The Committee of 
State Secretaries 
was established as a 
new form of 
‘administrative’ 
consultative body 
staffed by political 
appointees.  
- The pre-2006 
arrangements of 
Permanent State 
Secretaries (PSS’s) and 
the committee of them 
(CPSS) were re –
introduced.  
P
ro
c
e
d
u
ra
l/
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
 
- Preliminary 
opinion 
process 
provides 
horizontal flow 
of information 
and ideas 
between 
ministries in the 
initial phase of 
governmental 
decision making 
process. 
None substantial 
changes. 
- Establishing 
coordination 
committees for the 
coordination of 
special policy fields 
(e.g. the European 
Union 
Harmonization 
Committee) 
- The importance of 
horizontal 
preliminary opinion 
process between 
ministries has been 
decreased or entirely 
eliminated. 
(Source: own compilation and analyses)
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Based on the overview of the literature, academic debates and governmental documents 
surrounding the issue between 1990 and 2014 four important milestones were identified in 
relation to the structural features of central government coordination. These periods shows a 
rather stable pattern: the central government coordination has been, with the desire to strengthen 
it, - throughout the Hungary’s post-transition history - a very frequent, one could say escalating 
objective of administrative reform intentions and actions. 
As regards the solutions chosen for enhancing coordination (the coordination instruments) the 
following key findings have been established regarding the commonalities of reforms.  
1. Firstly, most of the governmental efforts at improving coordination centred on the Prime 
Minister Office and the state secretaries committees. Coordination was hoped to be 
improved by shifting power distribution towards the central government (the PM and his 
political executive apparatus) away from the ministries and “their” sectors. 
2. Secondly, it can be detected that there was an increasingly government intention – 
particularly due to the building blocks, that resulted “regulatory impotence” - to increase 
the party political influence over the whole government machinery, and to enhance the 
centralization within public administration. This trend can be best observed from the 
third phase of my analyses (from 2006, but one could say this tendency already started in 
1998 with the first Orbán - Government [cf. Körösényi 2001]). This political interference 
in public administration peaked during the second Orbán government (between 2010 - 
2014). 
3. Thirdly, the different structural and procedural measures being (re-)introduced can be 
characterized as containing varying mixes of mostly hierarchical but also non-hierarchical 
instruments were introduced in the different reforms. Notably the hierarchical 
instruments were dominated in the formal coordination mechanism.  
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As regards the solutions chosen I have established the following key findings regarding the 
commonalities of the territorial coordination reforms.  
1. Firstly, coordination efforts came, without exception, “from above”; that is, they were put 
on the agenda and – to broadly varying extents – enforced by the government. Evidence 
of spontaneous coordination initiated either by the county level branches or by their 
national level parent agencies did not appear. 
2. Secondly, most of the governmental efforts at improving coordination centered around 
the general-scope middle-tier organ of the government (Prefects’ Offices and their 
successors). Coordination was hoped to be improved by (shifting) structural 
arrangements, in the focus of which these organs stood (the only – albeit important – 
exception being the hierarchical coordination by the minister heading the Prime 
Minister’s Office between 2006 and 2010). 
3. Thirdly, the different structural measures being (re-)introduced can be characterized as 
containing varying mixes of hierarchical and non-hierarchical instruments were 
introduced in the different reforms. Notably however, these instrument mixes – and the 
experiences with them – differed in some important respects. It seems that ,without the 
strong support from the central government, or in the case of insufficient governmental 
commitment and political power, the 'hard'/ hierarchical coordination instruments stayed 
ineffective during the reforms. These types of instruments were only partially - or not at 
all – implemented under these circumstances. In this context - when there was no 
insufficient political power – the coordination mechanisms primarily based on horizontal 
coordination instruments. These were highly dependent on interpersonal relationships 
and the willingness of stakeholders to cooperate. Real and substantial coordination 
outcomes could be observed only, if the implemented hierarchical coordination initiatives 
are supported by significant political power and central government commitment. These 
differences are briefly summarized in the table below. (Table 4) 
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Table 4: Coordination measures (M) and their effects (E) in subsequent reforms of 
territorial state administration reforms 
 
Reform / period Changes in hierarchical instruments  
Changes in non-hierarchical 
instruments 
The prefect system 
(1990-94) 
M None M 
Requesting information, forming 
proposals/opinion, convening (ad 
hoc) coordination meetings 
E None E 
Little systematic effect. Effects based 
on personal, informal relations 
County 
Administration 
Offices (1994/96-
2006) 
M 
Integration of certain branches 
into County Administration 
Offices 
M 
(In addition to the previous ones)  
- The coordination meetings got 
institutionalized (County 
Coordination Committee with 
subcommittees doing substantive 
jobs). 
- “Initiating” coordinated actions 
such as joint inspections by different 
authorities 
 
E 
The expected effects (elimination 
of parallel functional units, 
standardization of operations) are 
likely to have ensued. 
E 
There are some modest but 
noticeable results achieved by the 
Coordination (sub)Committees e.g. 
related to training, civil service 
registry systems, and ICT. These 
happened through mutual adjustment 
of field branches. 
Regional 
Adminisration 
Offices (2006-
2010) 
M 
- Further standardization of HR 
registry, ICT systems, 
procurement 
- Areas for concerted action (joint 
inspection) are clearly defined 
Note that both happened through 
centrally (through 
ministries/national headquarters), 
largely circumventing 
Administration Offices 
M 
The County Coordination 
Committees were turned into 
Regional Coordination Committees, 
thereby their size significantly 
increased. 
E 
- The measures seems to have 
worked as expected 
E 
Work in the larger, merged 
Committees became more 
cumbersome and ineffective. 
County M - Creation of a system of general- M None 
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Government 
Offices (2010-) 
scope state administrative organs 
from the ministry level down to 
the District level characterized by 
a very tight system of control – 
both administrative and (explicitly) 
political 
- Wholesale, radical integration of 
most county branches’ support 
functions and client services into 
the County Government Offices  
- Entities within this hierarchy are 
given clear and unquestioned 
authority over both lower 
(District) level units and county 
level branches of other sectors. 
E 
The tight system of top-down 
control and accountability seems 
to be working as expected in the 
sense that actors obey the new 
rules to a significant extent and 
have little room for “sabotaging” 
them. (Much of the allegedly) 
parallel structures and functions 
have been eliminated. Whether or 
not this improves coordination at 
large is uncertain at this point. 
E 
It seems that spontaneous 
coordination / mutual adjustment 
has diminished / become more 
formal. 
(Source: own compilation and analyses) 
On the basis of the evidence and research results the two hypotheses seem to be confirmed. 
Namely:   
Hyp(1/b)1: Hierarchical coordination instruments are likely to be introduced if, and only if, a given actor’s –
central government actors– political and power base significantly strengthens. In the absence of such a clear shift in 
power relations, however, hierarchical instruments are unlikely to be introduced. 
Hyp(1/b)2: If such a clear shift in power relations does occur then non-hierarchical instruments are, in contrast, 
unlikely to be adopted. This type of instruments is mostly relied upon only if balanced power relations are 
sustained. 
Moving towards and turning to the third research question, namely: 
RQ(3): To what extent did the different instrument mixes work as intended? In particular: is there a 
significant difference in this regard between hierarchical and non-hierarchical instruments?  
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This third research question regarded the outcomes of different – more specifically: more versus 
less hierarchy-based - instruments and instrument mixes. Here I formulated two competing 
hypotheses corresponding to two different theoretical perspectives. The instrumental-rational 
perspective would imply that different (more versus less hierarchy based) coordination 
instruments create actual effects, at least “statistically”, to a similar, or at least not vastly and 
systematically different, extent.  
Hyp.(3/Alt.): Different – in particular: hierarchical versus non-hierarchical instruments - do not systematically 
differ in terms of their ability to trigger actual change in coordination patterns. 
The contrary perspective however would imply that only instruments congruent with key actors’ 
latent or explicit expectations and assumptions regarding the nature of the problem and its 
solution have a potential to alter their actual behavior.  
Hyp.(3/Null): Coordination patterns change – in the sense of real immediate effects occurring in the field – only 
as a consequence of applying hierarchical coordination instruments. In the absence thereof no actual change is likely 
to occur. 
 
In this regard my findings are somewhat mixed. Most of my findings seem to rather support the 
neo-institutionalist perspective: the vast majority of actual changes detected in the target areas of 
governmental intervention happened exclusively as a consequence of applying hierarchical 
coordination instruments. One should however not leave unnoticed the – albeit limited but 
definitely existing – effects of horizontal coordination instruments (e.g. the County Coordination 
Committees) Albeit the actual effectiveness of this instrument varied over time, at least at some 
periods it did significantly alter actors’ behavior.  
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3.3. The Government Windows experience in a comparative perspective 
The 1/c research question inquired about the structural features of Government Windows one 
stop shop. 
RQ (1/c) What are the main features of the Hungarian one stop shop – the Government Windows -, 
and how do these features relate to other countries’ similar experience? 
A useful comparative framework for analyzing one-stop-shops is offered by Askim et al. (2011). 
Below I examine and locate, using the evidence presented earlier, the Government Windows 
experience in most important analytical and comparative dimensions these authors offer. 
- The width of Hungarian Government Windows’ task portfolio is, compared to the three 
cases discussed by Askim et al. (2011), extremely broad. It covers dozens of very diverse 
case types ranging from citizen registration to matters related various social, health and 
family administrative affairs, construction affairs, and entrepreneurial licensing. This is in 
sharp contrast with the relatively narrow task portfolio of the Danish, Norwegian and 
UK one-stop-shops focused on labor and/or social affairs.  
- The depth of the task portfolio, on the other hand, is quite shallow as – at least in most 
of the case types they serve – Government Windows can be considered as “first-stop-
shops”; that is they receive requests and documents but operate only as front offices of 
the administrative apparatuses actually being in charge of handling and deciding the cases. 
- The next analytical dimension is the participant structure of agencies. This concept 
denotes several sub-concepts a key one of which is the number and heterogeneity of 
agencies participating in the one-stop-shops. The Hungarian case represents an extremity 
in this regard too as Government Windows integrate almost all – that is, about 30 
different and very heterogeneous – agencies present in the middle tier of administration. 
This is in sharp contrast to the cases discussed by Askim et al. where the number of 
participants is in the range of 1 to 3. Not only the number of participants but also their 
structural relation to one another seems to be unique in the comparative perspective 
offered by Askim et al [2011].: in this regard their analytical dimension ranges from 
single-agency framework from a multiple agency framework, in the latter case however 
the agencies preserving their structural distinctiveness and integrating only their client 
services. The Hungarian Government Windows are however on the verge of this 
spectrum as participating agencies are partially integrated in the Government Offices 
(note that technical and operational management functions are integrated into the 
Government Offices (and, on an national level, into the National State Administration 
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Center supervised by the MPAJ) and only the policy related matters continue to be 
supervised by the respective national agency). 
- The Government Windows case represents an outlier in respect to the autonomy of 
participants and the nature of management instruments involved, too. Participation is 
compulsory for the affected agencies, and much of the management systems – HRM, 
budgeting, ICT, facility management, supporting services – are centrally controlled, 
leaving agencies a minimal extent of autonomy.  
Table 5: Analysing the structural features of ‘Government Window’ within the analytical 
model by Askim et al. (2011)  
Variables/Dimensions 
 
 
Task portfolio Broad/Heterogeneous Narrow/Homogenous  
Deep  Shallow  
Participant structure Complex  Simple  
Autonomy High/ 
bottom-up  
Low /  
top-down  
Proximity to citizen Close  Distant  
Instrument  High integration Low integration 
Source: own compilation and analyses based on Askim et al. [2011] analytical model 
On the basis of this brief comparative overview one may conclude that the Hungarian 
Government Windows, while technically satisfying the definitional criteria for being a one-stop-
shop, stretches the concept in a number of key analytical dimensions.  
3.4. Motives of government coordination initiatives: searching for possible alternative 
explanations 
One of the main intention of my research is to improve current understanding regarding the 
nature and the determinants / motivating factors of administrative reforms by examining the 
applicability of four influential (probably the four most influential) competing explanatory models 
enrolled under the two type of logics of behavior - the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequences - to the Government Window initiative. 
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Table 6: 'Prediction matrix ':testing the rival hyphothesis 
Rival  explanatory 
theories 
Decision  
Activities 
Logic of 
appropriateness 
Logic of consequences 
“Myth of 
Central 
Control” 
Europeanization Power Rational 
problem solving 
process 
1. Problem definition P N Y P 
2. Alternative solutions Y N Y N 
3. Ex ante analyses Y P Y N 
4. Role of external 
stakeholders 
Y P Y N 
6. Monitoring the 
achievement of 
objectives 
Y Y Y N 
Y: yes (prediction confirmed);  
P: partial (prediction partially confirmed);  
N: no (prediction not confirmed). 
Source: own compilation and analyses based on the analitical framework of Wilson and Woodside [1999: 217] 
According to the ambition of the second research question, the motives underlying the 
Government Windows reform were examined and tested with regards to which one of the four 
proposed explanatory framework fits actual data the best. The research question was: 
RQ (2) What are the main motives underlying the initiation of different coordination 
instruments/instruments mixes? In particular, which explanatory model seems to have larger explanatory 
power in the context of Hungary’s recent one-stop-government reforms? 
Based on the results and evidence, two out of the four hypotheses could be rejected with relative 
certainty. That is, the one-stop-government reform at hand  
- can be neither explained as a result of Europeanization and transposing the relevant EU 
legislation, 
- nor is it to be seen as a rational problem solving exercise aimed at improving 
coordination and administrative services. 
These findings seem to add up to (elements of) a larger picture displaying a context obsessed with 
power and influence and disregarding technical imperatives of policy coherence, coordination 
and quality of institutions.  
There are two other explanations, both of which are congruent with the empirical evidence 
having been detected so far: 
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- the Myth of Central Control – having characterized post-transition Hungary’s past two 
decades of government coordination – as well as 
- the core executive’s strife for maximizing its formal and informal power and control over 
administrative processes and apparatuses seem to be plausible explanations of the 
Government Windows reform.  
- Whether one or the other, or possibly some combination, of these (not necessarily 
mutually exclusive; cf. March and Olsen 2006) explanations holds true it is not possible to 
tell on the basis of the analysis presented here. 
In sum, the hypotheses (2/Null) seem to be confirmed by the empirical material, namely: 
Hypotheses (2/Null): Coordination reforms and measures are not necessarily made because there are well-defined 
demands, real needs and facts which require governmental action. Rather, coordination measures are guided by the 
norms and rules that are commonly shared among actors, governments actions are driven by the standards of 
appropriateness. 
 
 
Coming to the overall conclusion, it seems that the pre-defined hypothesis were confirmed rather 
than disconfirmed by the empirical material. 
I gave an overview of Hungarian government coordination landscape during the post –transition 
period in my dissertation. From the point of view of the current research the key conclusion to 
be reached on the basis of the analysis is that efforts at improving coordination were limited to 
an extremely narrow set of measures, restricted practically to the strengthening of bureaucratic-
hierarchical control. Moreover not only governmental actions were limited to this narrow 
concept of coordination. Rather, the entire problem perception, or framework, in which policy 
makers, politicians and academics alike conceived the very problem of coordination was 
restricted to this “top-down” style conceptualization. Other approaches, understandings or 
instruments forming a standard element of the coordination discourse as well as the action 
repertoire in countries of Western/Northern Europe or North America – such as non-
bureaucratic (network or market type) coordination mechanisms, “bottom-up” or horizontal 
coordination concepts or arrangements – were almost entirely absent.  
The professional / scholarly discourse on coordination was possibly even more unequivocally 
“obsessed” with top-down bureaucratic coordination. It is indicative that, for example, the most 
ambitious overviews of Hungarian government of the past decades discusses and conceives of 
coordination analogously with the strength of hierarchical role played by the central actor over 
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the dependent, subordinated units. [pl. Müller 2011:120-138, Sárközy 2012, Ivancsics–Bércesi 
2006, Bérsesi 2006, Balázs 2006] 
In thinking about the roots of this “obsession” of thinking as well as action on central 
coordination with command-and-control exerted by the PMO over ministries (the latter 
conceived of as political players, organized interests and bureaucratic apparatuses alike) the pre-
history and genesis of the post-1990 politico-administrative framework appears as a key 
explanatory force. Before 1989 the Communist Party could – on the basis of various formal 
structural, informal (“nomenklatura”) and cultural-ideological instruments – exert a significant, 
nevertheless definitely far from being “total”, extent of coordinating influence over sectoral 
apparatuses. After the collapse of this steering and coordinating function no functionally 
equivalent system emerged. To the contrary: driven by various – political and ideological – 
considerations on the part of both the (then) pro-regime and opposition players as well as on the 
part of the key players of first democratically elected parliament a series of strong veto points and 
veto players were instituted in the liberal democratic, post-1990 system. Therefore the strong 
functional pressures acting towards the creation/strengthening of central oversight and control 
mechanisms were resisted very effectively for 20 years, the landslide victory of the FIDESZ 
government. No wonder that the new government continued to think and act in the command-
and-control-style conceptual framework of coordination having dominated the entire post-1990 
period – this time, however, getting rid of the political and institutional checks and balances 
blocking any major changes throughout the previous two decades. 
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4. Utilization of Research Results 
My dissertation has an intention to give an overview of the results of my broader empirical 
research in the field of Hungarian governmental coordination. 
Firstly, with my research I wish to fill an important gap in available Hungarian as well as English 
language literature by giving a descriptive account of developments of coordination landscape 
within the Hungarian public administration in the post-1990 period. My overview had a special 
focus on one particular issue: namely, the functioning, (perceived) problems and solutions of 
coordination, its ever-changing institutional landscape, and the recurring attempts at fitting these 
elements into a more workable whole. The results of my research and the case study, that was 
delivered seem to be a useful basis and starting point for further international comparative 
studies. 
My second ambition was to explore the roots of the controversial relationship between reform 
goals and their results, thereby adding an important element to the peculiar mosaic picture of 
how the problems of governmental coordination are understood and managed in Hungary, and 
the important ways in which this understanding differs from, and possibly defies being fully 
grasped by, the mainstream concepts of coordination and coordination instruments. Hopefully, 
the different conceptualizations of coordination - and the problems, mechanisms and the 
instruments surround around it - that was presented and interpreted in my dissertation enable the 
Hungarian researchers and practitioners to think and act in a varied and more sophisticated way 
about government coordination, and enable to go beyond purely hierarchical approach of 
coordination. 
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